




Antitrust law and antitrust economics have, over the course of
many years, developed a patois or jargon of impressive size. "Rule
of reason," "price fixing," "cross licensing," "power to exclude" are
among the many terms not infrequently used with respect to antitrust
cases or antitrust policy. Generally, they do not enjoy the preciseness
of a dictionary definition. For the most part, however, their birth
and growth have shaped the course of antitrust enforcement. Their
influence on the scope of the antitrust laws has been marked.
In recent years, two terms have increasingly found their way into
antitrust literature and antitrust cases. Both have serious implications
with respect to the future course of the antitrust laws. The terms are
"substitute products"-for which "alternative products" is a synonym
-and "oligopoly." The antitrust prosecutor is likely to assert that
they were invented by the devil, by which he means defendants' at-
torneys. Defendants' attorneys would be prone to deny authorship,
but would argue that if these terms are shoes that fit a situation, why
should they not be used? Attorneys are hardly to be blamed if they
and economists, by intellectual prowess and able publicity, have nurtured
these terms into sturdy weapons of defense to a monopoly charge.
Both are increasingly used to explain why particular situations should
not or do not come within the Sherman Act. Both are buttressed by
the insistence of numbers of businessmen that examination of the
"market" in action, the operations of businessmen in competition with
one another, shows that these terms are regularly evaluated factors
translated into business judgments. With respect to "substitute
products" at least, we may add that the theory, if not the terminology,
has been a problem with which the courts have wrestled for many years.
SUBSTITUTE PRODUCTS
When Humpty Dumpty fell off his wall, no one seems to have
suggested that a substitute egg might take his place. This may be
* The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not of any gov-
ernment agency.
t Member, New York and Supreme Court Bars. Attorney, Department of Jus-
tice. LL.B., 1932, Columbia University.
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because the event occurred in a less sophisticated age or, perhaps,
because there was something about Humpty Dumpty which could not
be readily found in other eggs.
Today we live in a world of multiplicity of products. And from
the fact of similarity comes substitutability. For example, nylon for
silk; aluminum for copper. The no-longer-daily milkman commonly
offers the householder a choice of paper containers or milk bottles.
Even in the nineteenth century there were significant substitute
products. Our ancestors could choose linen or cotton cloth, brick
houses or wooden houses, black shoes or brown shoes. But, it is
undoubtedly true that when the Sherman Act was passed in 1890,
science had hardly begun to add to man's possessions the host of
products which have since been made available to him. It seems fair
to say that the scale of advertising today assures a consciousness of
substitute or alternate products hardly likely to have existed at an
earlier period. Significantly enough, however, much of current adver-
tising seeks to persuade the reader, viewer or listener not that he has
many alternatives to choose from, but that the thing advertised is
unique or superior to alternatives.1
How does all this affect the antitrust laws? The argument appears
to be that substitutes represent a kind of countervailing power, the
existence of which may preclude the presence of monopoly power
or be a sufficient check upon such power as to obviate action under
the Sherman Act. The writer is not aware of any published claim
that a doctrine of substitute products would preclude the application
of section 1 of the Sherman Act to the price-fixing of, say, white bread
or glass bottles. But with respect to monopoly under section 2 of the
Sherman Act, the case is otherwise. Antitrust cases involving the
question of substitute products are to be found prior to the present
decade,2 as are occasional references to the subject in economic texts.3
1. See General Elec. Co. v. Thrifty Sales, Inc., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1956
Trade Cas.) 68482 (Utah Sept. 22, 1956); Smith, Product Differentiation and
Market Segmentation as Alternative Marketing Strategies, 21 J. MARKETING 3
(1956). In recent years we have seen many conglomerate mergers as well as product
diversification without mergers. In such cases, it is not uncommon-especially in the
trade press-to find advertising in terms of alternate products, e.g., copper wire or
aluminum wire.
2. In United States v. Corn Products Refining Co., 234 Fed. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916),
appeal dismissed, 249 U.S. 621 (1919), defendants in 1914 introduced testimonial evi-
dence of competing products, and the Government presented rebuttal testimony. This
evidence does not appear to have been objected to, possibly because the hearing was
held primarily before a special examiner rather than before a judge.
3. See THoRELLi, Tng FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY; ORIGINATION O AN AmitI-
CAN TRADITION 110 (1955); WILCOX, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN AMERICAN
INDUSTRY 4, 9-10, 12 (TNEC Monograph No. 21, 1940) ; Wallace, Monopolistic Com-
petition and Public Policy, 26 Am. ECON. Rv. 77 (Supp. 1936).
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It seems fair to say, however, that only in recent times has the matter
received a major share of attention. 4
The Problem as Evolved in the Cellophane Case
In 1947 the United States brought an antitrust suit against E. I.
du Pont de Nemours & Company. Du Pont was charged with
monopolization of cellophane. Since du Pont controlled about seventy-
five per cent of the output of cellophane in this country, it may be
surmised that the Government considered the suit as an orthodox
example of monopoly. Prior to the trial, however, it became apparent
that the defendants would rely heavily upon an attempt to prove inter-
product competition. Any conception that all the Government had to
do was to make out a case with respect to cellophane was dispelled
when, over its objection, the court permitted the defendants to make
proof of competition between cellophane and other packaging materials
such as glassine, pliofilm, wax paper, aluminum foil, cellulose acetate
and polyethelene film.'
The trial court, in holding for the defendants, gave great weight
to this competition of substitute products. Judge Leahy acknowledged
that economists differed as to the significance to be attached "to the
presence in the market of products which are substitutes or alternatives
for the product said to be monopolized." He found, however, that "the
relevant market for determining the extent of du Pont's market control
is the market for flexible packaging materials. . . . Cellophane is
forced to meet competition of other flexible packaging materials. The
competition between the materials is intense and du Pont cannot
exercise market control or monopoly powers." 0
Elsewhere in its opinion and findings, the court discusses the
problem of substitute products in the context of control over price.7
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Government in its brief pro-
pounded the major issue in terms of whether the lower court had erred
in using the existence of competing substitute products as a test to
determine whether du Pont had monopoly power. On the other hand,
4. For a review of the development of economic thought on the problem, see
Stocking & Mueller, The Cellophayw Case and the New Competitions, 45 Am. Ecox.
Rev. 29, 44-48 (1955).
5. One of these materials was parchment paper which previously had been held
subject to the provisions of § 2 of the Sherman Act. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson
Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
6. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 60, 88 (D.
Del. 1953).
7. Id. at 206-09.
19561
188 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105
the defendant's counsel, in brief and in argument, presented the primary
issue in terms of whether it was proper for the trial court to have
considered substitute products as a test to determine whether du Pont
had monopoly power over price.
8
There can be major differences in the use of the doctrine of
substitute products to test monopoly power and its use to test monopoly
power over prices. The first could readily emasculate section 2 of the
Sherman Act. The second would impede its application-how gravely
would be left to a series of decisions to determine. For the most part,
commentators have not made the distinction adduced in the du Pont
case by the defendants. They have generally been concerned with the
degree of substitutability and the rightness or wrongness of considering
substitutability to determine the existence of monopoly power. This
may be, however, because quite often their discussion of monopoly
power is in the context of an analysis of power over price.
Certain positions taken or alleged to have been taken by the
government in its brief and on argument before the Supreme Court
have been sharply criticized in a recent article.9 Whatever may be
said on that score,"0 the thesis of the instant article is opposed to the
authors' apparent position that it was necessary for the Government
to prove a broad flexible wrapping materials market, a cellophane
market not appreciably narrower, and "abandon reliance on proof
of mere existence of monopoly power in cellophane." "
The argument in the Supreme Court was well attended, perhaps
in realization of the importance of the issues.' That the Court had
considerable trouble with the problem presented by the case appears
from the fact that although it was argued during the first week of the
fall term, in October 1955, it was not decided until June 11, 1956, the
last day on which opinions were rendered. By a vote of four to three
8. With respect to the power to exclude, defendants took the position that valid
patent rights gave them such power with respect to moisture-proof cellophane.
9. Dirlam & Stelzer, The Cellophane Labyrinth, 1 ANTITRUST BULL. 633 (1956).
10. The approach of this article varies considerably from the position taken by
both parties before the Supreme Court.
11. Dirlam & Stelzer, supra note 9, at 640.
12. Of this case it has been said that, "The whole process of antitrust enforcement
has undergone a great change since the cellophane case was decided against the gov-
ernment. . . . Unless the decision is reversed by the Supreme Court, the case appears
to have shifted antitrust-enforcement philosophy back to the 'rule of reason' of the
1920's. . . . How good this is for the economy and how much it will lessen competi-
tion, only the future will tell." Harris, The Urge To Merge, Fortune, Nov. 1954, pp.
102, 240-42. It has been termed "a quiet revolution." QUINN, GIANT CoRPoRarIONS:
CHALLENGE TO FREEDOM 118 (1956). See also Business Week, Sept. 22, 1956, p. 88.
ANTITRUST BUGBEARS
the Supreme Court affirmed " the lower court's decision in an opinion
which was even more far reaching than that of the lower court.
Said the Court: "If cellophane is the 'market' that du Pont is
found to dominate, it may be assumed it does have monopoly power
over that 'market'. . . . Moreover, it may be practically impossible
for anyone to commence manufacturing cellophane without full access
to du Pont's technique." But since, "What is called for is an appraisal
of the 'cross-elasticity' of demand in the trade," and upon that appraisal
cellophane is "part of this flexible packaging material market," it is
immaterial whether "du Pont could . . . exclude competitors .
from the manufacture of cellophane." "4
The effect of this decision is to exempt from the monopoly laws
an identifiable annual business of over $100,000,000. By a process of
legal-economic chemistry, cellophane disappears as an object of trade
and commerce subject to monopolization under the Sherman Act,
albeit we can still obtain cellophane as an object by asking for it, can
observe it upon removal of our legal spectacles, can feel it, can pay
taxes upon it, can sue for breach of contract or tort with respect to it,
and, in a non-illegal way, even engross it.
The du Pont case acknowledges no debt to a publication which
had appeared one year before the trial court's opinion. But in 1952,
the Business Advisory Council made a report to the Secretary of
Commerce, who gave it a warm endorsement. The report was entitled,
Effective Competition. It was not welcomed in antitrust prosecution
circles. The report recommended the use of "effective" or "workable"
competition as a test for the application of the antitrust laws. A
cornerstone of that tenet was "substitute products." "5
13. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956). Jus-
tice Reed rendered the opinion for the majority. With him were Justices Burton,
Frankfurter and Minton. The dissent consisted of Justices Black, Douglas and War-
ren. Justices Clark and Harlan did not participate in the decision. Justice Frankfurter
wrote a concurring opinion in which he disassociated himself from certain dicta in
Justice Reed's opinion.
14. Id. at 391-92, 394, 400, 403.
15. "The main task in interpretation and administration of the antitrust laws in
the public interest should be to decide whether or not effective alternatives exist in
any given imnarket, or at least whether freedom exists to create such alternatives. In
deciding, administrators should be required to give consideration to alternatives avail-
able from any sources, whether or not the source happens to be within the conventional
boundaries of this or that industry." Businss ADVISORY CouNcIL, ErFECtiVE Com-
P Tr ION 9 (1952). For a statement that the goal of antitrust law is more workable
competition rather than workable competition, but a market analysis that seems incon-
sistent with the statement, see Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 34, 55-57, 83 (1955) ; cf. AN-
SHEN & WORMUTH, PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AND PUBLIC POLICY 88 (1954): "Monopolis-
tic competition is not incompatible with 'effective competition' or 'workable competition'.
Substitutability in the field of differentiated products serves as a check upon the pro-
ducer or seller." See also PGRUm, T x RGULATION O1 INDUSTRY 89 (1949) ; STOCK-
ING & WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE 13 n.8 (1951). With respect to
this view it has been said, "The public policy implications of this line of reasoning are
fairly obvious. It leads readily to acquiescence in the status quo and to a low estimate
of the value of remedial action designed to increase the number of sellers and reduce
the monopoly elements in industrial markets." Id. at 99. See also note 70 infra.
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Does Section 2 of the Sherman Act Require Finding a
"Market" Having Substitute Product Boundaries?
Neither section 1 16 nor section 2 of the Sherman Act 17 make
reference to a "market" concept. The proponents of the substitute
products rule do so, however, by importing into the Sherman Act a
requirement that a market be found.
Perhaps the leading exponent of this view is the report of the
Attorney .General's National Committee To Study the Antitrust Laws,
published in March 1955.18 The Report starts with the statement that,
"The general objective of the antitrust laws is the promotion of
competition in open markets." Some pages later, in discussing section
1 of the Sherman Act, the Report states that cases arising under that
section may pose at least four main issues, one of which is "in what
market is the effect of the challenged arrangement to be tested, and
what evidence is relevant in establishing that market as a fact to be
found by the court?" 19
Not until page 44 of the Report, in a footnote, are we told that
definition of a market is not necessary in all cases under section 1 of
the Sherman Act. Such concession is not made with respect to a
monopolization charge under section 2 of the Sherman Act. To the
question, "Monopolize what?," the Report answers, "A market."
And both the majority and dissenting opinions of the Supreme Court
in the Cellophane case adopt this approach.
But, section 2 itself furnishes the object of the verb "monopolize"
by the phrase, "Any part of the trade or commerce." o The use of
a substitute product test to import into the Sherman Act a market
requirement would change the language of the act. It might result in
confining the application of the quoted clause largely to problems as
to the geographic application of the federal antitrust laws.
Prior Decisions
In 1911, the Supreme Court in the Standard Oil case 2' pointed
16. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952) : "Every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
17. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1952) : "Every person who shall monopo-
lize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or per-
sons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations . ..."
18. Hereinafter cited as RPoRT.
19. RPoR at 12. The RpORT adds: "Finally, in what relevant market, does the
conduct challenged 'unduly' restrain competition?" Referred to with approval in Com-
ment, The New Federal Trade Commission and the Enforcement of the Antitrust
Laws, 65 YALt L.J. 34, 47 (1955), where it is said: "The antitrust laws deal with
market problems; they must be construed in terms of market standards or market
analysis."
20. Emphasis added.
21. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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out that the early English statutes which forbade engrossing did not
require that the quantity engrossed be the whole "or a proximate part
of the whole of an article." 22 Turning to the Sherman Act, the Court
said:
"The commerce referred to by the words 'any part' construed
in the light of the manifest purpose of the statute has both a
geographical and a distributive significance, that is it includes
any portion of the United States and any one of the classes of
things forming a part of interstate or foreign commerce." 13
This interpretation was subsequently broadened to include "any
part of the classes of things forming a part of interstate commerce." 24
It has been pointed out that the Sherman Act applies to monopolies of
limited duration.2 " And there is a long line of cases 26 in which the
22. Id. at 53.
23. Id. at 61.
24. Farmer's Guide Co. v. Prairie Co., 293 U.S. 268, 279 (1934), approved and
applied in United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 226 (1947). But in several
recent antitrust cases-Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 151 n.6
(1951); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 173 (1948) ; United
States v. Yellow Cab Co., supra at 225-the Supreme Court has spoken of an "ap-
preciable" part of commerce. "Appreciable" is not found in the statute. Whether the
Court had in mind something more than de inininzts is not clear. If it did, it is a qual-
ification which should be rejected. Congress hardly intended one rule for those affected
by a "small" monopoly and another rule for those affected by a "large" monopoly.
25. Peto v. Howell, 101 F.2d 353, 356 (7th Cir. 1938) (corner of July corn on
Chicago market).
26. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 612 n.31
(1953) (newspaper advertising as distinguished from other mass advertising media) ;
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 172-73 (1948) (motion pic-
tures licensed for first-run exhibition as distinguished from subsequent runs) ; United
States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947) (taxicabs from one source for four
cities as against taxicabs generally from other sources); Farmer's Guide Co. v.
Prairie Co., 293 U.S. 268 (1934) (advertising in certain farm journals in certain re-
gions as against advertising in farm journals generally) ; Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump
Co., 198 F.2d 416, 422-23 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952) (one type of
pump as distinguished from other types of pumps) ; Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit
& Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484, 487 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952)
(particular business location as against other business locations); United States v.
National City Lines, Inc., 186 F.2d 562, 566-68 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 916
(1951) (one customer's purchases of petroleum products, busses and tires as against
the total market for such products) ; United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416,
425-26 (2d Cir. 1945) (primary aluminum as against scrap aluminum and competing
metals like copper); Fashion Originators' Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 80, 85 (2d
Cir. 1940), aff'd, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (designs of certain dresses as against designs
of and other dresses) ; Peto v. Howell, 101 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1938) (July corn on
Chicago market as distinguished from other corn) ; Bausch Mach. Tool Co. v. Alum-
inum Co., 72 F.2d 236, 241 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 589 (1934) (primary alum-
inum as against aluminum from scrap and foreign sources) ; Lee Line Steamers, Inc.,
v. Memphis, H. & R. Packet Co., 277 Fed. 5 (6th Cir. 1922) (steam boat lines as
against railroad lines); United States v. Kansas City Star Co., 1955 Trade Cas.
[ 68040 (W.D. Mo.); Cape Cod Food Products, Inc. v. National Cranberry Ass'n,
119 F. Supp. 900, 908 (D. Mass. 1954) (raw cranberries or processed cranberries) ;
United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1945) (linen
rugs as against other floor coverings) ; United States v. Corn Products Refining Co.,
234 Fed. 964, 974-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), appeal dismissed, 249 U.S. 621 (1919) (starch
and syrup made from corn as distinguished from starch and syrup made from other
raw materials); O'Halloran v. American Sea Green Slate Co., 207 Fed. 187(N.D.N.Y.
1913), rev'd on other grounds. 229 Fed. 77 (2d Cir. 1915) (sea green slate as against
slates of other colors and other roofing materials); see American Tobacco Co. v.
United States, 328 U.S. 781, 789 (1946); cf. Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States,
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courts have applied section 2 of the Sherman Act to a part of trade
and commerce with an express or implicit rejection of the premise
that the existence of substitute or alternative products precluded a
holding of monopoly. 7 A similar approach has been taken in cases
arising under section 3 28 of the Clayton Act,29 as well as under the
Federal Trade Commission Act."
This approach has also been taken where the "part" was a geo-
graphical part which was a well-recognized political unit,3 ' as well as
where the part lacked such identity. 2 This has also been true with
respect to combinations in restraint of trade." One of the most famous
297 U.S. 553, 600 (1936) (domestically refined cane sugar as against off-shore and
beet sugar); United States v. New England Fish Exchange, 258 Fed. 732 (D. Mass.
1919) (ground fish as against other fish); United States v. King, 229 Fed. 275 (D.
Mass. 1915) (Aroostook County potatoes). See also Keyes, The Shoe Machinery Case
and the Problem of the Good Trust, 68 Q.J. EcON. 287, 294-97 (1954).
27. In distinguishing some of these cases, the Supreme Court in the Cellophane
case refers to four cases-Fashion Originators' Guild, Paramount Pictures, Associ-
ated Press and Times-Picayune-as being concerned only with the question of whether
there had been an attempt to monopolize. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395-96 n23 (1956). But the Supreme Court's opinion in the
Paramount case, at the very outset, pointed out that the defendants were charged with
monopolization. It also said that, "The controversy over monopoly relates to monopoly
in exhibition and more particularly monopoly in the first-run phase of the exhibition
business." United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 167 (1948). The
lower court, in its findings and conclusions of law, had expressly found there was no
monopoly. The Supreme Court directed the lower court to reconsider findings as to
monopoly. Id. at 173. On remand the trial court entered a considerable number of find-
ings of fact as to the existence of monopoly status and power. E.g., F. 147(d):
"There is substantial proof that monopoly power existed among the eight of distribu-
tor-defendants who were all working together. . . ." Four of the conclusions of law
expressly dealt with "monopoly." Thus, according to conclusion 13, "The collective
monopoly power of the defendants named in Paragraph 7 above (taken together with
Paramount and RKO) to exclude competitors from first run coupled with their intent
to exercise this power violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act." It is submitted that the
Paramount case was not correctly cited on this point. Furthermore, a distinction be-
tween attempts to monopolize and the achievement of monopoly in this context seems
quite dubious. Would the Court allow the Government to prove du Pont attempted to
monopolize cellophane or would it have required the Government to prove an attempt
to monopolize flexible packaging materials? And, if the former, what kind of relief
could the Government get where in fact there was a monopoly but the Court permitted
a finding only of attempt to monopolize? Query whether in the Paramount case the
Government would have been able to obtain divorcement and divestiture if only an
attempt to monopolize had been found.
28. Section 3 prohibits tie-in contracts which may have the effect of substantially
lessening competition or "tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." 38
STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1952).
29. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) ; Oxford Varnish
Corp. v. Alt and Wiborg Corp., 83 F.2d 764, 766 (6th Cir. 1936).
30. Fashion Originators' Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1940), aff'd,
312 U.S. 457 (1941) ; Eastman Kodak Co. v. FTC, 158 F.2d 592, 594 (2d Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 330 U.S. 828 (1947).
31. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219,
236 (1948) ; White Bear Theatre Corp. v. State Theatre Corp., 129 F.2d 600 (8th Cir.
1942).
32. William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 150 F.2d 738, 744 (3d Cir.
1945), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 811 (1948).
33. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1945) (the complaint
Aso charged attemut to monopolize); United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co.,
83 F. Supp. 284, 307-08 (N.D. Ohio 1949), modified on other grounds, 341 U.S. 593
(1951).
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judges of the century-Judge Learned Hand-has been, perhaps, the
foremost apologist for this approach. 4
On the other hand, it is rare to find a court rejecting evidence
of this kind.35 Most of the reported cases seem to accept the admis-
sibility of such evidence 36 without express ruling on the question. And
there is a line of cases difficult to reconcile with those we have cited.
In Standard Oil Co. v. United States," three oil companies
owning patents on processes for cracking gasoline effected a cross
licensing contract under which the primary defendants could maintain
existing royalties. The Government had charged violation of both
section 1 and section 2 of the Sherman Act with respect to gasoline
produced by the cracking process. The court found there was no
monopoly or illegal restraint with respect to cracked gasoline. It then
found that the latter was about twenty-six per cent of the total gasoline
produced, the rest of which was indistinguishable from cracked gasoline
and either mixed or sold interchangeably. It stated that the defendants
therefore had no effective control over the supply and the price.3"
The case has been somewhat limited, but not repudiated, on this score.39
Other cases have taken a similar approach,4" and the much-criticized
Times-Picayune case 4  could be-and was-cited by both sides in the
du Pont case when the latter reached the Supreme Court.
The substitute product theory would seem to accept a finding of
monopoly in a town of 1,000 of a product for which substitutes were
34. United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); Fashion Orig-
inators' Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1940), aff'd, 312 U.S. 457 (1941);
United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 371-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, 326
U.S. 1 (1945) ; United States v. Corn Products Refining Co., 234 Fed. 964 (S.D.N.Y.
1916), appeal dismissed, 249 U.S. 621 (1919).
35. But see United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 186 F.2d 562, 572-73 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 916 (1953).
36. It may be noted that in merger cases under § 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 STAT.
731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1952), defendants often try to prove separ-
ability of markets or distinctiveness of product in order to show absence of competi-
tion, while the plaintiff argues the contrary. E.g., International Shoe Co. v. FTC,
280 U.S. 291 (1930); American Crystal Sugar, Co. v. Cuban-Am. Sugar Co., CCH
TRADE REG. REP. (1956 Trade Cas.) 1168473 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 1956); Hamilton
Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 206 F.2d 738
(2d Cir. 1953).
37. 283 U.S. 163 (1931).
38. On the basis of the assignments of error and the briefs filed in the case, it is
difficult to see how this issue came before the Court.
39. See Farmer's Guide Co. v. Prairie Co., 293 U.S. 268, 279 (1934).
40. Cole v. Hughes Tool Co., 215 F.2d 924, 938-40 (10th Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 927 (1955) (types of well-drilling bits) ; Fargo Glass & Paint Co. v. Globe
Am. Corp., 201 F.2d 534 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 942 (1953) ("Dutch Oven"
gas ranges); Bigelow v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 167 Fed. 721, 729-30 (6th
Cir. 1909) (Lake Copper or Best Lake Copper as against other copper) ; cf. United
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948) ; United States v. Crown Zeller-
bach Corp., 141 F. Supp. 118, 130 (N.D. Ill. 1956). See also Business Week, Sept 22,
1956, p. 88.
41. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
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not available, even though outside the town no such monopoly existed,
but would not recognize as a monopoly complete control in a nation
of 200,000,000 people of that product if there were other substitute
products!
How far this search for a market and the use of substitutes as
a test therefor may lead may be seen from the fact that some economists
have asserted that the Aluminum case 2 was wrongly decided because
the court refused to consider the "market" as including secondary
aluminum (scrap) and other competing metals.3 And this assertion
has been made despite the fact that the antitrust suit was a primary
factor in converting a one-company industry into one where four
major companies compete; where one of the new companies has been
the primary innovator and which has become increasingly competitive
with other metals because of the increased competition within the
aluminum industry.
It may be noted, moreover, that in recent years the price spread
between aluminum and its main competitive metal, copper, has widened
considerably from what it was at the time of the trial of the Aluminum
case.
Substitute Products and Demand
Markets are created by demand, and this is true whether the
demand is for a specific thing or a class of things. Consumer preference
will generally give identity to the thing preferred. The fact that there
are substitutes or alternatives cannot ignore the reality that after an
initial period in which to gauge demand, it will generally be true that
continued production is for the purpose of meeting demand. If that
situation exists, the product and its producers have a market. Nor
is there any chemical or physical law that each product must have one
market or industry."4 There are domestic markets, foreign markets,
retail markets, wholesale markets, to name a few in which we may
find the same product bargained for. Who is there to say that there
could not be a monopoly of the one because of the existence of the
others? So, also, there is no technical common-law doctrine of merger
which causes a smaller market for a product to disappear because of the
existence of a larger market at the same level of distribution.
42. United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
43. See Merriam, The Sherman Antitrust Act and Business Economics, N.Y.
STATS B.A. ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM 98 (1950). A few years ago, this writer
was present at a conference of prominent economists where one economist stated that
it was ridiculous for the United States to have charged Alcoa with a monopoly in
aluminum since there was widespread competition between aluminum and copper.
44. Cf. Fouraker, A Note on the Definition of a Commodity, 23 So. Ecow. J. 80
(1956).
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At least up to the point where there is a mingling of things within
a class, the concept of monopolization of any part of the class would
seem well within the understanding of layman, lawyer or economist.
The greater the degree of identity (uniqueness) of the member, the
more readily may this be perceived even after mingling. Of course,
even if indistinguishable after mingling, monopolization may arise
when viewed in the light of how much of the whole is the part wholly
monopolized.
At any rate, if I want to buy cellophane in a free market it is no
answer to tell me that I can buy glassine in a free market or in a
partially free market. And it may be doubted that a suit for failure
to deliver cellophane could be defeated by the promissor's willingness
to deliver glassine. Nor can fungibility be considered the test as to
the existence of monopoly power where there are substitutes, since it
ignores the factors of time and availability. 45 A shortage, for in-
stance, may create a demand for a segregated quantity of a fungible
commodity, control of which may well appeal to the monopolist.
It is submitted that if a thing may be restrained within the
meaning of section 1 of the Sherman Act, it may be monopolized
within the meaning of section 2 of the Act. If all the makers of
cellophane agree to, and do, fix the price of cellophane at one cent
higher than certain other packaging materials, this is both an agree-
ment in restraint of trade and an exercise of monopoly power, whether
or not there were substitute materials.46  If the parties to the agree-
ment find they cannot maintain the agreement, it is hardly likely to
be of long duration and both the restraint and the monopoly power
will disappear. If there were an agreement among all cellophane
makers to restrict the output of cellophane, here again there would
be both an agreement in restraint of trade and an expression of an
intent to exercise collective monopoly power.
Let us suppose there are five cellophane makers doing a profitable
business, and one acquires the other four. Does the fact that there
45. See CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY or MONOPOLISTIC CoMPrTITION 62-64 (6th
ed. 1948). In Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 613
(1953), the Court considered that advertisers viewed the city's newspaper readers,
morning or evening, "as fungible customer potential," and therefore the advertisers
obtained the same "product," namely, access to newspaper readers, whether they adver-
tised in a morning paper or in an afternoon paper. The Court seems to have assumed
that all persons buy two newspapers a day and that there is no advantage to any reader
in reading an ad in the morning or in the afternoon. One wonders whether the judges
realized that it is not uncommon where there is a morning and an afternoon paper for
the same advertiser to take quite different ads. The advertisers, moreover, with a lim-
ited budget, might well prefer the afternoon rather than the morning readers, and by
so doing recognize that the latter have an identity of their own. The Government, in
its brief in the du Pont case, suggested the absence of fungibility as a possible dis-
tinction between that case and others.
46. Cf. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
19561
196 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105
are glassine, wax paper and other packaging materials take such
acquisition out of either section 2 of the Sherman Act or section 7 of
the Clayton Act? In each instance, the possible or actual harm to
the public is obvious, and is the type of harm the Sherman Act was
designed to prevent.
To take a more difficult case, let us suppose that a number of
consumers desire to buy red, white and blue streamers together, but
not merely red ones. Can red streamers be monopolized? The
answer is, "Why not?" Suppose I bought up all the supply of red
streamers in order to engross the supply. Suppose there were only
four companies which made red streamers because they were not as
popular as other streamers. If someone acquired all four companies,
here again an engrossment or monopolization might occur. It is no
answer to say that in some near time in the future others would make
red streamers and the monopolization would be of short duration. He
who engrossed the supply of wheat going to the market on one day
could hardly exculpate himself by saying that tomorrow there would
be no engrossment.
4 7
The presence of substitute or alternative products may well be
a curb on monopoly power. But so, for that matter, are taxes, floods
and the antitrust laws. A patent holder may have to contend with
competing patented processes or machines, but few would deny that
he has a monopoly within the scope of his patent.48  The scope of
monopoly power may range from very weak to very strong. But as
long as the power exists and is intended to be used or has been
achieved through means which do not recommend themselves to the
courts, it is difficult to see how it can avoid offending the public
interest protected by the Sherman Act. The force and effect of
monopoly power within a small, but not unimportant economic orbit,
cannot be ignored because in the larger orbit it has less effect. Persons
within that lesser orbit should not be read out of the Sherman Act
by a doctrine of substitute products.
47. Cf. Steers v. United States, 192 Fed. 1 (6th Cir. 1911) (combination in re-
straint of trade of a producer's tobacco). In the red streamer case posited in the text,
if the acquisition occurred before Christmas and the price went up, an action of dam-
ages by one having standing to sue would not be defeated because at the time of the
suit the price had fallen by reason of the fact that more producers had come into the
market. According to one economist, some economists have failed to distinguish be-
tween competition between goods and between sellers and this has led them to claim
monopoly cannot exist because of the first kind of competition. MACHLUp, Tia Eco-
NOMICS OV SaLumRs' CoaipgmrIioN 82 (1952).
48. If the patentee sells his rights to someone for $100,000 because of the belief
of the buyer that the process or machine will be widely accepted in preference to alter-
natives, and this turns out to be otherwise, it remains a fact that it was monopoly
power that brought the patent holder the amount he received.
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All men are animals, therefore all animals are men, is a classic
example of illogic. It would seem equally fallacious to say that because
all cellophane is in the flexible packaging field, all flexible packaging
materials are in the cellophane field.
Is the Doctrine of Substitute Products Compatible With the
Concept of Monopolization of an Industry?
The central discussion of monopoly in the Attorney General's
Committee Report 49-written largely by lawyers, we may presume-
equates monopoly power with monopoly power over a market.50 In
a chapter entitled "Economic Indicia of Competition and Monopoly,"
for which the economists on the staff probably were primarily respon-
sible, we do find it said in a discussion of the effect of substitutes on
definition of the market: "It emphatically does not mean that public
policy can afford to be indifferent to the elimination of competition
within the industry. In the interest of rivalry that extends to all
buyers and all uses, competition among rivals within the industry is
always important." " But even this thought becomes buried in a lengthy
economic discussion in which the market is the central theme. 2
The Report's approach would seem to confine the antitrust laws
to a world of buyers and sellers, an economic world in which the public
is interested only as consumers, a public whose only or primary
interest as such is in the price of a commodity.
Commercial activity is not merely a matter of buying or selling
a commodity. It never has been. A monopolization of an industry,
certainly at common law, and in the minds of the authors of the
Sherman Act, was something to be prevented by application of the
antitrust laws; the right to invest in, to work in, and to make a living
by manufacturing or practicing a trade is as much to be protected by
the Sherman Act as is the right of the seller of the finished product
to sell his wares in an unmonopolized market.' But to some econo-
49. See R.iP0RT at 44-48.
50. See Carlston, Basic Antitrust Concepts, 53 MICH. L. Rav. 1033, 1046-52
(1955).
51. RjPoR at 322.
52. For a similar approach, see Keyes, supra note 26, at 300-20. Keyes states that
the market to be concerned with is "that confronting the individual firm." The trouble
with such statement is that it does not specify who is to make that determination and
whether or not there cannot be more than one such market. The businessman might
say that his "market" is cellophane for some purposes and packaging materials for
others, or he might make an exclusionary choice, but judges, lawyers and economists
might well differ as to what market that firm is confronted with. In at least one case
involving complementary products, the court did find the market in terms of what the
largest producer manufactured. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F.
Supp. 295, 303 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
53. See THORzIu, op. cit. supra note 3, at 17-18, 22-25; Marcus, Civil Rights ad
the Antitrust Laws, 18 U. CHL L. Rev. 171, 185 (1951).
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mists, at least, attention to the buy-and-sell relationship tends to exclude,
automatically, other economic elements from their concept of monopoly
problems.
5 4
It is no answer to the entrepreneur who, because of his experience,
available capital or for some other reason, desires to manufacture
cellophane or produce aluminum rather than wax paper or copper, to
tell him that although that door is closed, he is free to make "substitute
products." Nor is that a satisfactory answer to the worker whose
skills or interests lie in one field and not in another." An employee is
engaged in trade and commerce. And it would seem not amiss that
the Sherman Act be concerned to protect him from undue concentration
as well as buyers and sellers of the product. Typically, monopolists in
a period of recession or depression will think first of cutting production
and employment, rather than prices." Monopolistic competition, which
is what the doctrine of substitute products leads to, is not compatible
with freedom of entry.5 7  "Effective monopoly" may, in the short run,
at times, benefit consumers. But competition and new entrants are
also part of the business cycle within the protection of the Sherman Act.
Industries and markets are not always distinguished. And in
some instances specification of the members of an industry may be
more difficult than designation of the sellers in a market. But the
concept of an industry is an important one.5 ' Government agencies
commonly compile business statistics in terms of industries. And
concentration studies usually focus upon the status of particular in-
dustries.5" Much more often than not, the term has a usable meaning
54. Thus, one writer attempts to define an industry in terms of the substittution
flexibility of a "consumer." Fouraker, supra note 44. Another economist dogmatically
asserts that, "Questions relating to competition, monopoly and oligopoly must be con-
sidered in terms of markets, while questions concerning labour, profits, technical prog-
ress, localization and so forth have to be considered in terms of industries." Robinson,
The Industry and the Market, 66 EcoN. J. 360, 361 (1956). Robinson gives no rationale
for this statement. It is submitted that questions concerning "labour, profits, technical
progress and localization" may be and have been considered as part of questions of
competition, monopoly and oligopoly.
55. Cf. Clark, Competition and the Objectives of Government Policy, in MONOP-
OLY AND COMPETITION AND TiiEm REGULATION 332-34 (Chamberlin ed. 1954).
56. See Ellis, Monopoly and Utemployment, in PRICES, WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT
(Post War Economic Studies No. 4, 1946).
57. "Under monopolistic competition, then, there can be freedom of entry only
in the sense of a freedom to produce substitutes .... " CHAMBXRN, THE THEORY
OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETrIoN 201 (6th ed. 1948).
58. Cf. MACHLUP, THE ECONOMICS oF SELLERS' COMPrTITION 214-16 (1952);
Chamberlin, Measuring the Degree of Monwpoly and Competitiol, in MONOPOLY AND
COMPETITION AND THIm REGULATION 258 (Chamberlin ed. 1954); Robinson, supra
note 54.
59. LEoNTIrE, STUDIES IN THE STRUCTURE op AMERICAN ECONOMY (1953); NA-
TIONAL BUREAU OP ECONOMIC RESEARCH, BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POL-
icy (1955). But cf. MACHLUP, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY Or MONOPOLY 486 (1952):
"The most serious defect of a concentration index as an index of degree of monopoly
is its failure to reflect competition from 'other industries.'"
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in the business world. The Small Business Act of 1953 defines a
small business concern as one "which is independently owned and
operated and which is not dominant in its field of operation." 10 The
Small Business Administration in administering this act has made
considerable use of industry classifications."1
In the manufacturing field, an industry may be defined in terms
of the products made or the processes of manufacture used. 2 "Physical
or technological structure and homogeneity of production are more
important considerations in the classification system than close sub-
stitutability of demand for products." ' This is a recognition that
things may be close substitutes for purposes of sale but not close
substitutes for purposes of production."4 And one's position in an
industry is generally measured in terms of value of output, employment
and fixed assets.65 These norms do not lose realism when the question
of monopoly arises.
Both the majority and minority opinions in the Cellophane case
make hurried references to a cellophane industry. The minority even
discusses competition within the cellophane industry, but avoids posing
an issue under section 2 of the Sherman Act of monopolization of an
industry by quickly retreating into a discussion of the "relevant
market."
Concentration in an industry cannot be ignored in an antitrust
analysis because of a search, perhaps unrewarding, for concentration
in a market. Industry concentration studies have been made with
respect to knit goods, wallpaper and many other commodities for
which there are obvious substitutes, in terms of percentage of em-
ployment accounted for by the leading three or four firms.6
There are many economic steps capable of being monopolized
before a finished product gets to the consumer. Let us take beet sugar
and cane sugar which have interchangeable end uses: Does the existence
of a larger amount of cane sugar than beet sugar mean that the
production, the manufacture or sale of beet sugar cannot be
monopolized? 617
60. 67 STAT. 233 (1953), 15 U.S.C. § 632 (Supp. III, 1955).
61. See Business Service Bull. No. 83, Dec. 1954.
62. NATIONAL BUREAU or EcoNoMIc RESEARcH, op. cit. supra note 59, at 18.
63. Id. at 21.
64. "Production means the creation of goods or services which have time, form,
or place utility. Thus every commodity which has a different form is, strictly speak-
ing, a different commodity, and even if the same good is available in different places
or at different times, it is also a different commodity." PEGRUM, op. cit. supra note 15,
at 89-90.
65. NATIONAL BupyAu o1 ECONOmIc RsEARCH, op. cit. supra note 59, at 89.
66. See id. at 74-75 (table 5).
67. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219,
236 (1948).
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If, in the packaging field, there were only one company in each
segment of that field, i.e., cellophane, pliofilm, etc., it would seem
anomalous that this situation could not be reached by the antitrust
law no matter how that solitary state had been arrived at or was
being used in the segment because the product of any one was a
substitute for the product of the other.6"
Power Over Price
The monopolist's range of power over price may be limited by
existence of substitute products in the market. This is not a relevant
consideration, however, as to whether there is a violation of the Sherman
Act if he has any power, not de-minimis, over the price of his product
arising from his controlling position as producer or seller or buyer with
respect to that type of product.
That the price of a differentiated product is the same as the
price of substitute products is not a negation of monopoly power over
the differentiated product.6 9 If there were active competition as to
that product, it might be that the price would reflect such competition
and as a result (1) be lower than it would otherwise, (2) be lower
than that of substitute products or (3) even force the price of the
latter to be lowered to meet the competitive price of the differentiated
product.7 °
The monopolist of a product almost inevitably has an advantage
over substitute product competition as to which such monopolistic
68. Cf. QuINN, GIANT CORPORATIONS: CHALLENGE TO FREEDOm 121 (1956).
"Competition is always possible from another industry and the song of the industry
monopolist today is that he is kept on his toes by that potential threat. That amounts
to an admission that there is no effective competition remaining in his own industry."
69. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC CoMPErITION 64, 67 (6th ed.
1948).
70. "Mr. Lilienthal is also inconsistent on the relation between the numbers of
competitors and the intensity of competition. He seems to think there is little if any
real relation. Yet he insists on the importance of inter-commodity competition, and
of the 'one big market' of the Continental United States. But their importance lies in
the fact that they introduce more competitors into any given market. The crucial
question is particular, not general: how much competition is introduced into the spe-
cific market at the specific time? Some of Mr. Lilienthal's own examples seem to me
to argue convincingly on the side of another and different kind of public policy from
the one he urges. Thus, he hints broadly that TVA was faced with high non-competi-
tive prices for copper transmission lines; but the monopoly situation was circumvented
by turning to aluminum cable at a considerable saving. It may be asked: What of buy-
ers who were businessmen, who had to worry about making a profit, and were subject
to the pressure of time and the cost of interrupted production? If there had existed
not one monopolist of aluminum but a few (big) competitors, might not aluminum
cable have been more widely and cheaply available? And if, in addition, the antitrust
laws had been more vigilantly enforced, would not the rigging of copper prices have
been impossible even without any special Government intervention?" Adelman, Sym-
posium Review: Galbraith's "Conwept of Countervailing Power" and Lilienthal's "Big
Business," 49 Nw. U.L. Rgv. 161 (1954).
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situation does not exist.71 The advantage need not be great if it has
economic significance.7 2  Moreover, the presence of such monopoly
power is itself an incentive for the evolution of a similar situation with
respect to substitute products.
A Place for Substitute Products
Should an issue of substitute products have any place in an
antitrust suit? Under some exceptional circumstances, the answer
may be in the affirmative. In a private antitrust suit on the question
of damages, it should be possible in some types of cases for a defendant
to show that the competition of substitute products had a definite bear-
ing upon the plaintiff's losses. But in such a case, a heavy burden
should rest upon the defendants to show that the plaintiff's damages
were caused by such competition rather than by plaintiff's wrongdoing.
On the question of relief in a suit seeking to change the structure
and practices of the major companies in an industry, it will generally
be improper to use the composition and practices of a competing
industry as a guide. Yet there may be instances where it may be
proper to consider the effect of a proposed decree upon the ability of
the industry to compete with that of a substitute product. Since any
effective decree in a monopoly case is likely to evoke from defendants
the cry of "chaos," which subsequent experience shows to be unwar-
ranted, the proponent of such argument should have a heavy burden of
persuasion before evidence as to a competing industry is permitted.
The Public Interest
It is submitted that the doctrine of substitute products, is not,
either by itself or as a refinement of the concept of countervailing
power, a satisfactory criterion for the application of the Sherman Act.
71. Cf. ELLIOTT, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL IN Tun NON Fiuaous METALS 383
(1937): "Intercommodity competition is always present in the fields of marginal use.
... The universal presence of this factor makes it impossible to consider the price
policy of any commodity in the abstract; it can only be considered in its relation to all
possible competitors. This factor also brings out differences in the organization and
policy of the respective industries; obviously a monopolistic organization is in a better
position to carry on this constant intercommodity struggle than is an industry of inde-
pendent and competing units, particularly if the monopoly pursues a discriminatory
and aggressive price policy in the fields of marginal use and recoups the losses from
its definitely established field."
72. In United States v. Kansas City Star Co., 1955 Trade Cas. f[ 68040 (W.D.
Mo.), the court charged the jury: "Monopolization need not extend to all substitute
or alternate advertising media. We should look rather to the question of whether or
not the alleged monopolist enjoys an advantage over his competitors which confers
upon him a monopolistic or controlling influence or domination. Monopolization may
be measured by the handicap or control it imposes. That advantage alone may create
a monopoly or make a monopoly unlawful." This charge probably owes much to the
remarks of Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp.
362, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). See also CHAMBERLIN, THE
THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COmpEITION 67 (6th ed. 1948).
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The generality of the Sherman Act has been recognized as one of its
most important characteristics. That generality should not be excised
by definitional limitations. It is one thing to use the term "market'
as a word of description in an antitrust situation where that term aids
understanding. It is quite another to use it as a definition to limit
the application of the act.
The public should not be confined to any single definition or
standard in receiving the benefits of the antitrust laws. We live
under a social system which is deeply concerned with the minority
and the individual as well as with majority groups. And the use of
concepts to deny the former the benefits of a broad social act such as
the Sherman Act casts doubt upon the validity of such concepts.
The value to society of differing sources of supply and of differing
productive operations for the production of a certain product may well
be greater than where the end product has numerous but substantially
similar origins. And so where there are alternative end products. An
act destructive of one type of origin or product may leave the others
unimpaired.
The end product is a form of wealth but so are the processes, the
know-how and the industrial operations from which it came. And the
economic consequences of the production of the product (e.g., the
growth of a city) may be as great, if not greater, than that arising from
the sale of the product. If we could scale uses in their order of im-
portance on a 100% scale, a use for which a particular type of product
was better than alternative types might have a social or economic
importance disproportionate to its percentage of the total sales of such
products. The Sherman Act should-and this writer believes it does
-protect the public from a monopoly of particular sources and of
particular productive operations as well as of particular end products.
There could be few antitrust cases won by a plaintiff, whether
private or government, if a defense of substitute products were freely
permitted."" It has been estimated that it cost du Pont over $1,000,000
72a. Cf. Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, CCH TRADE RG. REP. (1956
Trade Cas.) 168468 (2d Cir. Feb. 9, 1956); Inge v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp., CCH TRaE REG. RE,. (1956 Trade Cas.) 1 68429 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1956);
United States v. Ohio Crankshaft Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1956 Trade Cas.)
1 68405 (N.D. Ohio June 21, 1956). In United States v. Northern Pac. Ry., CCH
TRADE REG. RE,. (1956 Trade Cas.) 168401 (W.D. Wash. June 23, 1956), the court
on reargument expressly rejected the du Pont case approach as inapplicable to a tie-in
charge under § 1 of the Sherman Act. (The paragraph on this point, added to the
court's opinion after the reargument, does not appear in the Trade Regulation Service
Report.)
One of the issues in the pending appeal in United States v. Kansas City Star
Co., 1955 Trade Cas. 1 68040 (W.D. Mo.), in which monopoly of news and advertis-
ing was charged, is whether the trial court was correct in excluding defense evidence
as to billboards and national magazines. But the same court had permitted defense
evidence as to weekly newspapers or neighborhood shopping papers, catalogs, hand-
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to present this defense. The Antitrust Division has neither the money
nor the manpower to develop such issues. And such issues are hardly
likely to reduce the size of the "big case." The courts might well
prefer to wrestle with monopoly "with respect to some landmark more
measurable than 'cross elasticity of demand.' " "
Our antitrust laws and policies have been regarded by other
countries as uniquely broad and strong. Certainly, there is nothing
in the Sherman Act which would require an answer to the question
we have discussed which would cause us to lose that regard. Yet,
the doctrine of substitute products would permit a substantial weakness
in our antitrust laws which at least one foreign country-Canada-
appears to have rejected, 74 and another-England-has refused to
bills and direct mail advertising, local magazines, pamphlets, bulletins and the like
published by social, fraternal, religious and other organizations, street car cards,
movie newsreels, topical books and sky writing, among other things. As to this evi-
dence the court instructed the jury that if it "will determine for themselves the factual
situation as to what is and what is not in competition in the disseminating of news
and advertising within the metropolitan area." Id. at 70373.
73. Economists commonly discuss this problem in terms of "cross elasticity of
demand." See STiGLtR, THa THxORY or Pmcz 48-49 (1952). The practicing lawyer
might well shudder at attempting to explain to the average judge economic theories
of this subject. See the discussion in 45 AM. EcoN. RV. 373 (1955). While this case
was pending in the Supreme Court, two prominent articles, dealing in whole or in part
with the problem of the Cellophane case, were published. Both approached the issue
in terms of "workable competition" and were opposed to the result in the du Pont case.
One was written by Stocking and Mueller (The Cellophane Case and the New Comt-
petition, 45 AM. EcoN. Ray. 29 (1955)), and the other by Stocking (The Ride of
Reason, Workable Competition and Monopoly, 64 YAI4 L.J. 1107 (1955)). Both are
economists, the latter particularly noted for his support of broad application of the
antitrust laws. But shortly before the opinion of the Supreme Court in the substitute
products case was handed down, the "slipperiness of the workable competition" con-
cept was forcibly demonstrated by two other economists. Dirlam & Stelzer, The Cello-
phane Labyrinth, 1 ANTITRUST BuLL. 633 (1956). To this writer, support for this
criticism is found in the frequent use of those articles by both the majority and minor-
ity opinions in the Cellophane case. It is regrettable, however, that Dirlam and Stel-
zer's article offers no substitute approach or theory. In a recent Canadian case in which
the effect of price fixing was an issue, the court made the following pertinent comment:
"Mr. Robinette argued that one considered the matter of competition as a circle and
the inquiry must be directed to determine what segment of the circle was occupied by
price competition. I think there is much force in Mr. Arnup's argument that such an
approach involves a degree of economic speculation and psychological inquiry that is
not contemplated by the statute. To put on the Crown the proof of what influences
buyers to buy is a burden that has not yet been imposed by jurisprudence." Regina
v. Northern Elec. Co., [1955] Ont. 431, 443, 3 D.L.R. 449, 461-62.
74. The Canadian Combines Act, 1935, 25 Gao. 5, c. 54 (Canada), states that
monopoly "means one or more persons . . . . (b) who either substantially or com-
pletely controls throughout any particular area or district in Canada or throughout
anada, the class or species of business in which he is or they are engaged." In Eddy
Match Co. v. The Queen, 109 Can. Crim. Cas. Ann. 1, 14 (1953), the Court said:
"It is contended by appellants that the manufacture of wooden matches is not
a class or species of business. They say that the wooden match is a device for produc-
ing light or fire and as such it is in competition with every other device designed to
achieve the same end; viz, the paper match and the mechanical lighter ...
"It is true that the manufacture of lighting devices, whatever be the type or kind,
can be regarded as a general class of business which would include wooden matches.
But it seems strange to suggest that within the general class there cannot be as many
types of businesses as there are species of devices. . . . [Slince this commodity can
be distinguished from the other devices ...it must be said that the manufacture of
wooden matches is a class or species of business ....
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narrow its approach to monopoly problems by broadening a "market"
concept.
7 '1
It is submitted that neither the language nor the policy of the
Sherman Act calls for a contrasting position in this country.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in the Cellophane case was
rendered by less than a majority of the Court, it is to be hoped that the
government will not hesitate to press this issue again in another case
before the full Court. The gap in antitrust enforcement made by that




One may doubt that the term "oligopoly" was known to the
authors of the Sherman Act, nor to several early generations of lawyers
who subsequently dealt with antitrust matters.7 1 It has become, how-
ever, a term of considerable importance.
The single monopolist has become exceedingly rare, at least on
a national scale. In many industries, however, we find a small number
of companies controlling or dominating an industry. This situation
has become known as "oligopoly." It is one where the power or
position of each oligopolist is such that its individual action will have
an appreciable effect on the market."8 Normally, in an oligopolist in-
dustry, there is substantial uniformity of prices, especially (but not
necessarily) where the products are standardized."9 In such an in-
dustry, generally, the policies of a small number of companies with
75. The Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act, 1948,
11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 66, § 3(3) provides: "Where goods of any description are the sub-
ject of different forms of supply, the references . . . to the supply . . . shall be con-
strued as references to any of those forms of supply taken separately, to all those
forms of supply taken together or to any of those forms of supply taken in groups
. . ." in the discretion of the administering bodies. According to § 20(3), monopoly
criteria include "value or cost or price or quantity or capacity or number of workers
employed or some other criterion . . . ." alternatively or in combination, as appears
suitable to the administering body.
75a. Congress might re-enact § 2 of the Sherman Act and, by contemporaneous
legislative history, make clear its repudiation of the du Pont case and its understanding
that the language used in the act means what it says.
76. "Some ten years ago it was still possible that men professionally concerned
with economic questions had never heard the word 'oligopoly.' MACHLUP, THE Eco-
NOMICS OF SELLERS' COMPETITION 347 (1952). Resort to Words and Phrases reveals
a reference to a single case where the term was used. That case was the 1953 du Pont
suit, earlier discussed in this article. A German writer is said to have used the term
in 1914. See CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 8 n.2 (6th ed.
1948).
77. See MUND, GOVERNMENT AND BuSINESS 127-35 (2d ed. 1955); VATTER,
SMALL ENTERPRISE AND OLIGOPOLY (1955).
78. See ANSHEN & WORMUTH, PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AND PuBLIc POLICY 88
(1954).
79. In United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 49 (D.
Del. 1953), the court said: "'[O]ligopoly' is regarded as consisting of those situations
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respect to price-and often with respect to volume of production and
distribution-are determined in the light of knowledge that individual
company action will induce reciprocal action on the part of the other
large competitors."0 A common badge of oligopoly is "price leader-
ship." Even more common in this type of industry structure is the
promptness with which a price change by any one of the oligopolists is
matched by the other oligopolists. Basing-point and delivered price
systems are common where oligopoly is present. Oligopoly has been
thought to promote a philosophy of curtailment of production in order
to ensure a return on all costs."'
Characteristics commonly present when a single company domi-
nates an industry-such as control over supply and price and difficulty
of entry-are also commonly found in an oligopolistic industry.
Economists recognize that the rule of the few may have an effect
identical with dominance by one. 2 And it has been pointed out
that either monopoly or oligopoly on one side of a market is likely
to engender monopoly or oligopoly on the other side.' Oligopoly,
therefore, may be considered a form of monopoly, 4 although some
economists would not accept this premise.85 The Federal Trade
Commission, in considering mergers under section 7 of the Clayton
Act, has thought it proper to take into account the effect of the merger
upon making an industry oligopolistic88
where a few sellers sell only a standardized product." Despite this statement, an ex-
amination of economic authorities reveals that many do not make such qualification.
See WILCOX COMPI'TION AND MONOPOLY IN AMs~ucAN INDUSTRY 5 (TNEC Mono-
graph No. 21, 1940).
80. See WILcox, op. cit. supra note 79; Note, "Follow-The-Leaders" Clauses:
The Use of Ancillary Covenants as a Vehicle for Cooperative Monopoly, 64 YAIz L.J.
1049, 1056 (1955).
81. VArTIR, op. cit. supra note 77, at 58. Vatter explores at some length the effect
of oligopoly upon small enterprises in certain industries.
82. Cf. MAcHLUP, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY Or MONOPOLY 503 n.22 (1952);
PEGRUM, THn REGULATION OF INDUSTRY 88 (1949); VATTER, op. cit. supra note 77.
See also dissent in United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377,
414 (1956).
83. See GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM; THE CONCEPT OV COUNTERVAILING
POWER 119-21 (1952).
84. See MUND, op. cit. supra note 77, at 193; Bain, Conditions of Entry and the
Emergence of Monopoly, in MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION AND THEIR R GULATION 216
(Chamberlin ed. 1954); cf. STOCKING & WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTRPRISE
87-93 (1951); Vito, Monopoly and Competition in Italy, in MONOPOLY AND CoMPEnI-
TION AND THEIR PEGULATION 44-50 (Chamberlin ed. 1954); Wallace, Monopolistic
Competitimt, 26 AM. EcoN. RIzv. 77 (Supp. 1936).
85. Professor Stigler, after discussing the effects of substitutes, states: "This
leads us to define monopoly as a single seller of a commodity that does not have a
highly elastic demand." STIGER, THE THEORY or PRIcE 206 (1952). See also MuND,
op. cit. supra note 77, at 193. For a review of some of the economic thought on this
score, see Stocking, The Rule of Reason, Workable Competition and Monopoly, 64
YALE L.J. 1107, 1108-11 (1955).
86. Pillsbury Mills, Inc., F.T.C. Dkt. 6000 (Dec. 21, 1953).
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Although some economists recognize a relationship between the
doctrine of substitute products and oligopoly,8 7 many economists
appear to accept and discuss market control by an oligopoly without
acknowledging that a doctrine of substitute products would make an
oligopoly situation rare.8 There would be few oligopolies if the
breadth of a market were to be measured by the flexible rules of
substitute products.
Uniformity of Action Under the Sherman Act
Many a lawyer and many an economist (doubling as a lawyer)
would deny that an oligopoly is a condition reached by the Sherman
Act. This is especially true where the products made and sold by
the members of the oligopoly are wholly or substantially standardized.
It has been asserted that for an oligopoly to come within the Sherman
Act there must be collusion, and the distinction has been taken between
concert of action arising from agreement and concert of action arising
from the structure of an industry. On the other hand, the typical
oligopoly situation has been thought by some to come within the
Sherman Act.90
87. See VATTim, op. cit. supra note 77, at 114-15.
88. See WILcox, CoMPETTION AND MONOPOLY IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 10(TNEC
Monograph No. 21, 1940); Chamberlin, Product Homogeneity and Public Policy, 40
AM. EcoN. Rxv. 85, 87 (1950); Wilcox, On the Alleged Ubiquity of Oligopoly, 40
AM. EcoN. Rzv. 67, 68-69 (1950). See, however, STIGLa, THE T EoRY or PRIc 222
(1952): "When a few firms sell one product or products that are close substitutes,
each must take account of the effects of his policy on his rivals. This is the distinctive
problem of industries with few firms (oligopoly)." Galbraith points out that price
fixing under oligopoly may be more difficult than where there is a single monopolist
because there is never complete substitutability between different sellers. GAInRAITH,
AMERICAN CAPITALISM; THE CONCEPT OP COUNTERVAILING PowER 46 (1952).
89. See STOCKING & WATKINS, op. cit. supra note 84, at 88-89; 64 YALE L.J. 1049,
1057 (1955); cf. Morton Salt Co. v. United States, CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1956
Trade Cas.) f[ 68412 (10th Cir. July 5, 1956) ; ANSHEIN & WORMUTH, op. cit. supra
note 78, at 132, 268; CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF' MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 31
(6th ed. 1948). It has been recognized that the results of express agreement among
oligopolists and tacit agreement among them are very similar. SclTovsxY, WELFARE
AND COMPETITION 384 (1951). Heflebower, Monopoly and Competition in the United
States, in MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION AND THEm REGULATION 135 (Chamberlin ed.
1954), with respect to the legal position of oligopoly states, "The trend of the argu-
ment here, on both the economics and the law of monopoly and competition, points
toward a possible impasse with respect to oligopoly .... While such market structures
are not themselves illegal, increasingly their manifestations are. . . ." It has been
noted that the courts have readily found "free and open competition" under fair trade
laws in oligopoly situations. See Herman, A Note on Fair Trade, 65 YALE L.J. 23,
25-26 (1955).
90. MUND, op. cit. supra note 77, at 233: "The belief of many economists and
legal experts is that the Sherman Act (as well as the Federal Trade Commission Act)
can and should be applied to unified selling by a few dominant concerns who allegedly
are acting 'innocently and independently'. The situation of oligopoly can be attacked
(a) on the principle of conscious parallel action (implied conspiracy) or (b) under
section 2 of the Sherman Act as a condition of monopoly." With respect to (b), Mund
subsequently gives the rationale that "the larger companies jointly or collectively pos-
sess the power to control prices." Id. at 240. See also MACELUP, THE ECONOMlCS oF
SELLERS' COMPETITION 350 (1952) ; Levitt, Law, Economics and Antitrust Revision,22
So. EcoN. J. 405 (1955).
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Apparently many economists appear to believe that oligopoly
without collusion should not be condemned under the antitrust laws
although a number find it difficult to avoid a conclusion of collusion
where monopoly results are found.9 As far as the writer knows, the
issue has never been presented whether a group of defendants-without
a finding of collusion--can be held to have monopolized trade and
commerce under section 2 of the Sherman Act.92 Some courts have
recognized that a monopolist may have less freedom to engage in non-
competitive endeavors than a non-monopolist. 3  And a similar rule
might well be held to apply to an oligopoly."
It is, of course, clear that a monopoly charge under section 2 is
not limited to a monopolist but extends to a number of legal persons
dealt with in the aggregate. The cases where a monopolization charge
was upheld against a number of defendants are many.95 Writers not
infrequently say that in an oligopoly situation conspiracy, monopolistic
conduct or agreement is likely to occur, and that the proof to show
monopolistic conspiracy need not be strong.96 At least one case supports
such view.97  The argument that price uniformity in an oligopoly may
be as compatible with a competitive situation as with a collusive one
is much less likely to be true in a period of changing conditions than
under stationary conditions. The wider the geographical range of
91. See review qf opinions in DmIRAu & KAHN, FAIR CoMPTIrToN 33-34 (1954).
But see STOCKING & WATKINS, op. cit. supra note 84, at 112; Wallace, supra note 84.
92. In United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 352 (1947), the Court
rejected on various grounds the Government's request for divestiture of certain plants.
In discussing this request, the Court said that there was no showing that four major
competing units would be preferable to two, or six preferable to four. While this can
scarcely be considered a precedent one way or another it is not uncommon to find
antitrust judgments proceed on a theory that to dissipate monopoly something more
than the creation of one or two competitors is necessary. See also STocKING & WAT-
aNS, op. cit. supra note 84, at 551.
93. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948) ; United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass, 1953), affd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); Greenleaf
v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 79 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Pa. 1947); James v. Marin-
ship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 731-37, 155 P.2d 329, 335-38 (1944); Wilson v. News-
paper and Mail Deliverers' Union, 123 N.J. Eq. 347, 350-51, 197 At. 720, 722 (1938).
94. Cf. 64 YAL L.J. 1049 (1955).
95. E.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946). In the
American Tobacco case, the defendants' brief in the Supreme Court argued that the
phrase "every person who shall monopolize" in § 2 of the Sherman Act reached only
the conduct of a single person or corporation. The Government's brief listed a number
of cases which characterized the acts of more than one as monopolizing. The Supreme
Court in its opinion does not refer to this issue, possibly because, as argued by the Gov-
ernment, it was not within the scope of the grant of certiorari. Brief of the Appellee,
p. 41, American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
96. Cf. Dnmum & KAHiN, FAr Co iI=TTo 33-34, 65-76 (1954); Stocking,
The Rule of Reason, Workable Competition and Monopoly, 64 YALi L.J. 1107, 1111
(1955).
97. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946) ; cf. Morton
Salt Co. v. United States, CCH TRADE RFG. RPx'. (1956 Trade Cas.) 1 68412 (10th
Cir. July 5, 1956). See also Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S.
594, 612 n.33 (1953).
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price uniformity, the more likely it is that the basis of uniformity
has been collusion rather than competition." The members of an
oligopoly often act like a combination and it has been said that ".
the Antitrust Act has been construed as forbidding any combination
which, by its necessary operation, destroys or restricts free competition
among those engaged in interstate commerce . ... 99
It would seem that, at the very least, the oligopolists would have
a heavy burden in defending uniformity of action by a plea of inde-
pendency of action.' 0 The Supreme Court has held that "conscious
parallelism" is not conclusive proof of concert of action within the
Sherman Act.' The Attorney General Committee's Report has left
this reader in the dark as to the effect it would give to "conscious
parallelism"-whether it could take the plaintiff to a jury-and others
have experienced the same difficulty.' 2 It seems well settled, however,
that uniformity of action as to prices may give rise to an inference and
may be evidence of a concert of action under the Sherman Act.0 3
Artificial price levels may be regarded as especially suspect.0 4
The Attorney General's Committee has stated that, "The courts
class as 'monopolies' under section 2 those situations where a single
seller, or group of sellers acting in concert, have control over the market
price." "05 The Report does not discuss whether the "concert" may
be one arrived at by the independent determination of each member
98. See STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 239-40 (1952). The Government's brief
in United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., No. 3, U.S., Oct. 1956 term
argues strongly for a definition between "combination" and conspiracy. The case is
concerned with du Pont's stock interest in General Motors.
99. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 337 (1904).
100. As to the absence of inevitability of uniform prices in an oligopoly situation
even where there are standardized products, see THE BRITISH MONOPOLIES AND
RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES Comi[IssIoN, REPORT ON THE SUPPLY OF CERTAIN RUBBER
FOOTWARE 63-65, 72-75 (1956); THE BRITISH MONOPOLIES AND RESTRICTIVE PRAC-
TICES COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE SUPPLY AND EXPORT OF CERTAIN SEMI-MANUFAC-
TURERS OF COPPER AND COPPER-BASED ALLOYS 29, 47, 49 (1955).
101. Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount, 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954).
102. See Handler, Annual Review of Antitrust Developments, 10 N.Y. CITY BAR
AsS'N RECORD 332, 344 (1955).
103. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226-27 (1939); Na-
tional Lead Co. v. FTC, 227 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1955); Milgrim v. Loew's, Inc.,
192 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 929 (1952); Fort Howard
Paper Co. v. FTC, 156 F.2d 899 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946);
Hathaway Motors, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 18 F.R.D. 283 (D. Conn.
1955) ; see Markham, The Per Se Doctrine, and the New Rule of Reason, 22 So.
ECON. J. 22, 29 n.16 (1955). But see Pevely Dairy Co. v. United States, 178 F.2d 363
(8th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 942 (1950) ; Arkansas Fruit Co. v. Texas, 1955
Trade Cas. ff 68070 (Tex.) ; Handler, supra note 102, at 342-46.
104. It has been asserted that ". . . uniformity of price may be the result of agree-
ment or understanding, and that an artificial price level not related to the supply and
demand of a given commodity may be evidence from which such agreement or under-
standing, or some concerted action of sellers operating to restrain commerce may be
inferred." Cement Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588, 606 (1925).
105. REPORT at 43.
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of an oligopoly to act in concert or merely one where the parties have
agreed to so act. To the writer, the difference is negligible once the
performance of the dominant members of an industry is explainable
only either on the basis of express agreement or knowledge by each
that similarity of action by the others is expected and will take place.10 6
If X oligopolist raises prices expecting A, B and C-fellow oligopolists
-to do likewise, and they do, and the X price becomes the market
price, X may well be considered to have a monopoly power; and if A
raises the price and the others likewise follow, A may be considered to
have such power, and so of B and C. In such situation, each has
monopoly power whether by agreement or by the structure of the
industry. And it is concert of action no matter how it is sliced.
The courts have recognized the presence of collective monopoly.
1 7
It is true that in such cases conspiracy was also found. But it is
difficult to see how some economists find little difficulty in treating
collective monopoly as collusive oligopoly-10" but reject a concept of
monopoly where collusion is absent. It would appear that "monopoly"
could have economic content even if there were no Sherman Act. It
is significant that the courts have found monopolization by several
companies even though these companies were not affiliated. 9 Section
2 of the Sherman Act, unlike section 1, does not speak of an agreement
of monopoly. And if several companies may be held to have monopo-
lized under section 2 because they have acted as a monopoly, should
it matter that they acted as such by agreement or because of the
structure of the industry? It may be noted that, in recent years, the
courts in testing a practice by the antitrust laws appear increasingly
to have looked toward the collective effect of the practice engaged in
by a number of concerns, even though collusive concert of action was
absent." °
In the Aluminum case,"' the court was dealing with a one-
company monopoly. There, the court said, in language expressly ap-
proved by the Supreme Court," 2 with respect to the connection between
contracts fixing prices and the mere existence of monopoly:
106. Cf. STOCKING & WATKINS, op. cit. supra note 84, at 89.
107. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); United
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 881, 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), aff'd, 340
U.S. 803 (1950).
108. See MACHLUP, Tia POLITICAL ECONOMY Ov MONOPOLY 502 (1952).
109. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); American
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
110. FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953);
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 309 (1949). See also Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 612 n.33 (1953).
111. United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
112. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 813 (1946).
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"That distinction is nevertheless purely formal; it would be
valid only so long as the monopoly remained wholly inert; it
would disappear as soon as the monopoly began to operate; for,
when it did-that is, as soon as it began to sell at all-it must sell
at some price and the only price at which it could sell is a price
which it itself fixed. Thereafter the power and its exercise must
needs coalesce." 113
It would seem that this rule would apply equally where monopoly
power rested in more than one and less than many, and they fixed a
price.
It seems consistent with a concept of monopoly to envisage a
monopoly held by several persons even though not acting in combina-
tion with one another. Section 2 of the Sherman Act speaks of
monopolization, not merely combination to monopolize or monopolistic
combination. If I gave two persons the sole right to practice medicine
in a city, they have a monopoly of such practice in that city even
though they practice separately. And if they had secured that
position by buying up the practices of ten other doctors, there too, it
is submitted, monopolization would be present.
Prior to the Statute of Monopolies, 14 monopoly grants were
made by the Crown to more than one person by the same grant and
at least some of such persons do not appear to have been acting
jointly."-5 The Statute of Monopolies," the English Monopolies and
Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act "1 and the Canadian
Combines Act 118 define monopoly in terms of plural persons as well as
a single person. In this country, at an early date, the conception of a
monopoly in the hands of a few as well as in the hands of one appears
to have been acceptable legal thinking." 9
It would seem, therefore, that oligopoly could be reached under
section 2 of the Sherman Act either under a theory of concert of
action or on the theory that this section does not require the structure
of a monopoly to be conspiratorial.
113. United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945).
114. 21 JAc. 1, C. 3 (1623).
115. See Hulme, The History of the Patent System Under the Prerogative and
at Common Law, 12 L.Q. REV. 141 (1896). For a comment on a bible printing
monopoly held by four British publishers through historical bases, see 179 THE
ECONOMIST 877 (1956).
116. The act prohibits monopoly grants "to any person or persons."
117. Section 3(2) applies to two or more persons supplying at least one-third of
particular goods who "whether by agreement or arrangement or not, so conduct their
respective affairs as in any way to . . . restrict competition ..
118. See note 75 supra.
119. See Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 607
(1837).
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The Impact of Applying Section 2
It may be urged, however, that since oligopoly is frequently
found in American industry, a thesis that oligopoly is a monopoly
condition subject to the Sherman Act would require a reorganization
of a considerable part of American industry or at least bring much
of it under suspicion. There are a number of answers which may be
given to this proposition not altogether consistent with one another.
If oligopoly is a condition with which the policy and the language of
the Sherman Act is concerned, it is difficult to justify its existence by
an argument of its prevalence. Within the last fifteen years, few
large-scale industries have not been subjected to monopoly charges
without benefit of any monopoly-oligopoly theory. Again, if as a
number of courts have suggested, there are kinds of monopoly which
do not come within the Sherman Act,12 we may suppose that oligopolies
similarly situated would receive absolution. Many a monopoly stands
untouched because manpower or other considerations cause a selective
process in filing antitrust suits on the part of the Government. It has
been argued that original oligopolies might be viewed more harshly
than oligopolies brought about through the growth of "countervailing
power." 121 And while it might be urged that both should be attacked
concurrently, where this cannot readily be done the likelihood of
antitrust action as to the latter is diminished. Certainly, in monopoly
situations, it is realistic to assume that some examples of concentrated
power have not been touched because they have evolved to meet an
already existing concentration to which the antitrust laws have not
been applied.
Oligopolies are not necessarily alike. The facts as to one regard-
ing degree of concentration, degree of uniformity of action, means to
attain that position and to maintain it, integration, degree of competition
in respects other than price, and performance generally, will often
differ as to another; and such differences are significant in determining
whether a case will lie under the Sherman Act and whether it is one
which should be brought.
CONCLUSION
Antitrust prosecutors are neither Don Quixotes nor Sir Galahads.
But, just as a doctor cannot properly ignore a small but painful sore
120. Cf. Comer, Monwpoly and Competition, 36 Am. EcoN. RZv. 154, 158 (1946).
121. See GALBRAITH, AM ERICAN CAPITALISM; THn CONCEP ol COUNTERVAILING
Powr 144-47 (1952); Leovinger, Antitrust and the New Economics, 37 MINN. L.
RIv. 505, 537 (1953).
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because it is not a cancer, the antitrust practitioner cannot ignore a
small but painful economic wrong because it has not developed into a
large economic wrong. And society has no way of knowing the
comparative value to it of the legal persons injured by the smaller
wrong and those injured by the larger wrong.
Substitute products would protect monopoly until it developed
into super-monopoly, and oligopoly would protect even super-monopoly
as long as held by more than one. Neither should have an immunity
from antitrust prosecution.
